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abstract
Relations between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine appear to be stuck at the verge of a 
new era. While a new Association Agreement providing for an unprecedented degree of political 
cooperation and economic integration is ready to enter into force, political developments in 
Ukraine prevent the EU from proceeding with its signature and ratification. This peculiar situation 
represents a crucial test case for the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Effectiveness in this case is defined by the objectives that guide the EU in its pursuit of the ENP, 
and by the degree to which the Union lives up to its capabilities to reach them. In the case of 
Ukraine, the policy turns out to be largely effective, considering that the EU’s top priority is the 
avoidance of political and economic risks. However, this focus on risk avoidance severely limits 
the Union’s leverage regarding the attainment of any other policy objectives, most importantly 
norm transfer and security cooperation. Consequently, even a largely effective ENP is unlikely to 
have a significant impact on the situation in Ukraine and elsewhere as long as the Union does not 
change its priorities. 
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1. introduction
With the creation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) less then a decade ago, a new 
instrument entered the stage of European foreign 
policy. The ENP regulates a crucial aspect of the 
European Union’s (EU) foreign relations, because 
geographic proximity raises the stakes of foreign 
policy-making: on the one hand, it creates potential 
for cooperation, on the other hand, it increases the 
potential consequences of conflict or instability. 
At the same time, the ENP is widely regarded as 
the successor of the enlargement process, which 
the EU itself calls its “most successful foreign 
policy”.1 Consequently, the question whether 
the new approach has proven successful is very 
important for the evaluation of the Union’s role in 
global affairs.
At this point in time, the developments around 
the prospective Association Agreement between 
the EU and Ukraine present the most interesting 
test case for the ENP’s success. This is due to 
three main factors: First, Ukraine is a neighbour of 
crucial importance for the EU. Being after Russia 
the European country with the largest surface area, 
Ukraine shares a land border with four EU Member 
States, has a population of more than 40 million 
and acts as an important transit corridor between 
the EU and Russia. Second, the Association 
Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which is 
currently awaiting signature and ratification after 
more than five years of negotiations, represents the 
most advanced integrative stage of the ENP in its 
current form. Although the term itself is not new 
– the EU has concluded association agreements 
with numerous countries – the character of the 
Agreement in question is inherently different due 
to the significant degree of political cooperation, 
Common Market integration and Acquis 
Communitaire adoption it entails. A particularly 
important role in this context is played by the 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA) which the Agreement will create. 
1 European Commission, “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A 
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern 
Neighbours,” Communication COM(2003) 104final: 5, accessed 
April 23, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_
en.pdf.
Among the instruments envisaged in the current 
ENP strategy documents, association agreements 
including a DCFTA are the tools that offer the 
widest and deepest integration perspective. 
Ukraine was the first country to start and the first 
country to finalize negotiations on an agreement 
of this kind, which makes it the most likely case 
to show the full potential of the ENP in its current 
form. Third, EU-Ukraine relations have proven to 
be highly dynamic in the recent past. The country 
has witnessed significant changes in its domestic 
political environment. As a consequence, signature 
and ratification of the Association Agreement are 
made subject to political conditions by the EU, 
although negotiations on the Agreement’s content 
have been finalized. This peculiar situation has 
the potential to provide new insights into the 
implementation and impact of the ENP. 
This paper will analyse the implications of the 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement’s negotiation 
and suspended implementation for the ENP’s 
effectiveness. In the first section, a two-step 
approach based on goal consistency and the use 
of capabilities to facilitate goal achievement will 
be presented as a tool to assess effectiveness in 
the context of the ENP. After this, the following 
four sections will proceed to answer four guiding 
questions:
• Is the EU’s strategy based on a consistent set 
of prioritized policy objectives?
• To what extent does the implementation of this 
strategy match the EU’s capabilities to achieve 
these policy objectives? 
• What are the implications of the findings from 
the Ukrainian context for the ENP as a whole? 
• Which measures can the EU undertake in order 
to enhance the effectiveness of the ENP in 
Ukraine and elsewhere?
The analysis is based on academic literature, EU 
policy documents, Ukrainian media reports and 
a series of 14 interviews with western diplomats, 
Ukrainian officials and Ukrainian civil society 
experts conducted in Kiev in May and June 2012. 
It will be argued that the ENP in relation to 
Ukraine can be considered largely effective, since 
policy objectives are consistently prioritized 
and the actions taken meet capabilities to 
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a considerable extent. However, due to the 
dominance of risk avoidance as the EU’s primary 
objective and systemic factors beyond the EU’s 
control, the actual impact potential of the ENP 
is limited in Ukraine and elsewhere. At the same 
time, the policy as a whole turns out to be highly 
vulnerable to changes in its political environment. 
Consequently, the policy recommendations 
answering the last guiding question will illustrate 
that the EU is facing two options: it can either stick 
to its current priorities and focus on maximising 
the effectiveness of the ENP in its existing form, 
which means accepting its inherently limited 
impact potential; or it can attempt to increase the 
actual impact potential of the policy, which would 
require a shift of priorities. 
2. effectiveness and the eNP
In the field of political science analysis, 
effectiveness is generally defined along the line 
of purpose: an effective policy is a policy that 
achieves what it is supposed to achieve.2 Through 
this definition, effectiveness becomes the ideal 
benchmark to measure the success of a policy. 
However, in the case of the ENP, the question 
what exactly is to be achieved is more difficult 
to answer than it might seem at first sight. The 
purpose of the policy cannot simply be taken 
as a given. It first has to be extracted from a 
complex and ambiguous alignment of objectives. 
Complexity and ambiguity of the ENP’s purpose 
result from the possibility that the objectives 
at the basis of the policy are not compatible but 
work in opposite directions. Progress towards the 
attainment of one objective might come at the cost 
of regress of another. 
A good example for this is the constant conflict 
potential between the EU’s normative aspirations 
2 Cf. Christopher J. Bickerton, “Functionality in EU Foreign 
Policy: Towards a New Research Agenda?” Journal of European 
Integration 32 (2010): 213-227; Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz and 
Arild Underdal, “The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring 
Regime Effectiveness: Critique, Response, and the Road ahead,” 
Global Environmental Politics 3 (2003): 74-96; Oran R. Young, 
International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a 
Stateless Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 
142-151.
on the one hand, and its security interests on the 
other. Whenever an authoritarian regime is a 
reliable partner in fighting trans-border crime, 
preventing irregular migration or trading natural 
resources, the EU’s foreign policy is facing a 
dilemma. By supporting democratic change, the 
Union puts its cooperation with the respective 
regime at risk and accepts the possibility that 
political transition might destabilize the country. 
However, by supporting the authoritarian regime, 
the EU clearly undermines its own normative 
agenda. What results is a forced trade-off between 
two EU foreign policy objectives, which can 
easily lead to incoherent and contradictory policy 
making. The criticism facing the EU in regard to 
its relations with the Middle East and North Africa 
prior to the Arab Spring illustrates this problem 
very well. An example relating to the eastern 
neighbourhood is provided by Giselle Bosse’s 
work on EU-Belarus relations. She argues that 
“the EU’s approach towards Belarus is clearly torn 
between idealist values of democracy promotion 
[…] on the one hand, and the realist objective 
to support ‘state-stability’ through strategic 
institution-building assistance on the other hand.”3 
Returning to the initial definition of 
effectiveness, it can be said that the ENP will 
be effective if it fulfils its purpose. In order to 
establish whether this is the case, two analytical 
steps are required. 
• In a first step, it has to be established to what 
extent the policy has an identifiable purpose at 
all. The existence of such a purpose does not 
go without saying. A policy which gives equal 
priority to policy objectives that diametrically 
contradict each other cannot achieve what it is 
supposed to achieve, since every achievement 
in one dimension would simultaneously be a 
cause of failure in another. Consequently, a first 
test of the ENP’s effectiveness is the way in 
which the EU deals with the conflict potential 
between the different policy objectives that it 
pursues through the ENP. Conflict potential 
can be minimized by means of prioritization. 
3 Giselle Bosse, “Challenges for EU governance through 
Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership: the values/
security nexus in EU-Belarus relations,” Contemporary Politics 
15 (2009): 224. 
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Wherever one policy objective is getting in the 
way of another, consistent give-way rules have 
to be established. This prioritization has the 
character of a precondition which enables the 
ENP to be effective. 
• In a second step, the analysis has to focus on 
the actual core of effectiveness – the degree 
to which policy objectives are attained. 
Intuitively, goal attainment is often measured 
as the extent to which observable, graspable 
outcomes match ideals. However, such 
an approach omits a number of important 
considerations. It does not take into account 
that the results of certain political actions 
might be observable only after a considerable 
period of time has passed; that the situational 
constraints of a particular political setting 
might obstruct goal attainment and make 
anything but limited progress impossible; 
or that, in the face of certain circumstances, 
the prevention of regress might constitute an 
achievement comparable to what would be 
significant progress towards goal attainment in 
other situations. 
For this reason, this paper goes beyond comparing 
developments in Ukraine with the EU’s objectives. 
It measures the effectiveness of the ENP by 
looking at the extent to which the actions taken in 
order to attain policy objectives match the EU’s 
capabilities. By doing so, this paper determines 
whether there is a gap between what the EU can 
do in order to achieve its objectives and what 
it actually does. The smaller this capability-
facilitation gap, the more effective the ENP.4 
3. Prioritizing objectives 
In the Ukrainian context, four main objectives of 
the ENP can be identified. 
4 This concept is based on Christopher Hill’s idea of a Capability-
Expectations Gap in EU foreign policy. Cf. Christopher Hill, 
“The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s 
International Role,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31 
(1993): 305-328.
3.1 avoiding risks
The EU’s most important policy objective is not 
explicitly outlined in any official statement or 
policy document. Regardless of this, it is deeply 
engrained in the nature of the ENP. Debates on 
the EU’s absorption capacity and the final borders 
of enlargement, which have followed the policy 
from the very beginning, clearly illustrate a strong 
fear within the EU to enter into commitments that 
might push the Union to the limits of what it can 
politically and financially shoulder. 
It was this fear that led to the creation of the 
ENP as a successor of the enlargement process 
in the first place. The offer of a membership 
perspective to an ENP country, or the creation 
of any automatism towards such an offer, was 
perceived as a risk that the Union was not prepared 
to take. Accordingly, the EU did not include any 
notion of a membership perspective into the ENP 
and has not shown any willingness to change the 
open-ended character of the policy up to today. 
This unwillingness has become particularly 
obvious in the Ukrainian case. Already on the day 
negotiations were launched, External Relations 
Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner announced 
that membership would not be on the agenda.5 
Similar statements by different representatives 
of the EU continued during the course of the 
negotiation process.6 Although Ukraine issued 
strong demands for an EU membership perspective 
far into the final stages of the negotiations7, the 
5 “Комиссар ЕС охладил пыл Украины [EU Commissioner cooled 
down Ukrainian passion],” Ukrainskaya Pravda, November 15, 
2007, accessed September 8, 2012, http://www.pravda.com.ua/
rus/news/2007/11/15/4427459/.
6 E.g. “Саркози не пообещал Украине членство [Sarkozy did 
not promise membership to Ukraine],” Ukrainskaya Pravda, 
September 1, 2008, accessed September 7, 2012, http://www.
pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2008/09/1/4449122/;
 “Европа не собирается обнадеживать Украину [Europe is not 
prepared to give hope to Ukraine],” Ukrainskaya Pravda, April 
21, 2010, accessed September 7, 2012, http://www.pravda.com.
ua/rus/news/2010/04/21/4952775/;
 “Главные в Евросоюзе уже не обещают перспективы членства 
Украине [European leaders do no longer promise membership 
perspectives to Ukraine],” Ukrainskaya Pravda, July 1, 2011, 
accessed September 7, 2012, http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/
news/2011/07/1/6349447/.
7 E.g. “Азаров требует от ЕС перспективу: Украина – не 
невеста. [Azarov demands perspectives from the EU: Ukraine 
is not a bride],” Ukrainskaya Pravda, September 17, 2011, 
accessed September 7, 2012, http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/
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EU was not willing to compromise. 
In spite of the Union’s firm stance, the 
question of Ukraine’s membership perspective 
was not uncontroversial within the EU. A fierce 
debate took place already in the aftermath of the 
Orange Revolution: one group of Member States, 
most notably Poland and Lithuania, supported 
a membership perspective for Ukraine, while 
a second group led by France was strongly 
opposed.8 The differences between the viewpoints 
of these Member States persist until today.9 
However, since movement in important 
questions like future enlargement requires 
unanimity, the status quo carries a considerable 
inertia that is practically impossible to overcome 
if defended by a reasonably strong and determined 
group of Member States. The proponents of a 
Ukrainian membership perspective simply do not 
have the leverage to unsettle the EU’s general 
position which is based on the lowest common 
denominator – leaving the future open. 
On the whole, this forced consensus has been 
stable. The EU has stood firm on the membership 
question throughout the course of the negotiation 
process, and the Ukrainian side has not been 
able to take advantage of divergences within the 
Union. Ukrainian officials perceive the EU as an 
actor which overall pursues a united approach in 
relation to the negotiation process. The existence 
of diverging opinions did not significantly weaken 
the EU in the present case, since the negotiating 
position of the Union as a whole was clear, due 
to the fact that it had to be based on the lowest 
common denominator.10
Apart from the enlargement question, risk 
aversion also manifests itself as an objective 
on the financial side of the ENP. Throughout 
the period from 2007 to 2011, the EU has spent 
an average of only about €1,75 billion per year 
news/2011/09/17/6593790/;
 “Грищенко: Украина хочет сигнал члетство [Hryshchenko: 
Ukraine wants a membership signal],” Ukrainskaya Pravda, 
September 24, 2011, accessed September 7, 2012, http://www.
pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2011/09/24/6612982/.
8 Mathias Roth, “EU-Ukraine Relations After the Orange 
Revolution: The Role of the New Member States,” Perspectives 
on European Politics and Society 8 (2007): 505-527.
9  Interviews with western diplomats in Kiev, May/June 2012.
10  Interviews with Ukrainian officials in Kiev, May/June 2012.
through the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Instrument (ENPI) on the implementation of 
the ENP.11 If this sum is put into relation to the 
number of countries and people encompassed 
by the ENP on the one hand, and the size of EU 
funding for disadvantaged regions within the 
Union on the other, the financial effort that the EU 
undertakes for the benefit of the neighbourhood 
appears rather modest. This observation applies 
to Ukraine in particular. Considering the size of 
its population, Ukraine receives lower funding 
than numerous other ENP countries. Moreover, 
the funds received by Ukraine decreased in the 
two years after the launch of the Association 
Agreement negotiations. They were raised again 
in 2010 and 2011 but have not returned to the 
level of 2007. 
What these observations indicate is reluctance 
on the side of the EU to take financial risks for the 
sake of the ENP. The amount of funds invested is 
kept small enough not to put a significant strain on 
the EU budget. Even in the case of a country that 
is perceived as a frontrunner and has just started 
to negotiate a new integrative step of considerable 
significance, no exception is made. 
Finally, risk aversion has also been a strong 
motive in the more technical aspects of the DCFTA 
negotiations. The EU pursued a negotiation 
strategy with a strong focus on the prevention of 
possible disadvantages for the European economy. 
This resulted in drawn out bargaining processes on 
issues like import quotas on Ukrainian agricultural 
products, tariffs on European cars and second-
hand clothing, market access for Ukrainian 
energy and transport services, transition periods 
for Ukrainian export duties, and rules relating to 
geographical product names.12 The EU bargained 
11 European Commission, “Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2011. Statistical Annex,” Joint Staff 
Working Document SWD(2012) 122final: 35, accessed May 
24, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/
statistical_annex_en.pdf.
12 E.g. “Азаров пожаловался на жестокость ЕС [Azarov 
complained about the EU’s brutality],” Ukrainskaya Pravda, 
October 26, 2010, accessed September 7, 2012, http://www.
pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2010/10/26/5515363/;
 “Валерии Пятницкии: «Погибнут те, кто не хочет и не умеет 
работать. Выживут предприимчивые» [Valery Pyatnytskiy: 
‘Those who do not want to work or are not able to, will go down. 
Entrepreneurs will survive’],” Zerkalo Nedeli No. 38, October 16, 
2010, accessed July 20, 2012, http://zn.ua/POLITICS/valeriy_
IEP Policy Papers on Eastern Europe and C
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hard in spite of the fact that, due to the sheer 
size of the Union’s internal market, the effect of 
free trade with Ukraine on the EU’s economy is 
certain to be far smaller than the respective effect 
on the Ukrainian market. Nevertheless, the EU 
wanted to play safe and avoid even comparatively 
small risks for the economy of its Member States 
as well as the risk of setting a precedent for one-
sided concessions under the ENP.
3.2 exporting Norms 
Especially proponents of the external governance 
approach to EU foreign policy analysis13 argue that 
rule transfer is a policy objective of considerable 
significance in the context of the ENP. This 
argument is supported by the initial ENP strategy 
paper as well as the subsequent reviews of the 
policy.14 The documents clearly state in many 
places that – through the ENP – the EU aims to 
engrain a significant part of the norms that govern 
its political, legal and economic system in the 
respective systems of the partner countries. Norms 
in this context include both the general ideational 
principles to which the EU ascribes universal 
significance – democracy, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights – and the voluminous 
collection of more technical rules and standards 
set by community legislation. The projection of 
the former kind is seen as a normative imperative 
and as an important precondition for a deepening 
of relations with neighbouring countries. The 
projection of the latter kind is seen as desirable 
and practical in order to facilitate cooperation and 
bring about mutual economic benefits. 
However, the predominance of risk aversion in 
the EU’s strategy constrains the EU’s normative 
aspirations in Ukraine. Nevertheless, in the case 
pyatnitskiy_pogibnut_te,_kto_ne_hochet_i_ne_umeet_rabotat_
vyzhivut_predpriimchivye-61231.html; 
 “ЕС снял осаду. Украина сможет защитить внутренний рынок 
[EU has lifted the siege. Ukraine will be able to protect its internal 
market],” Kommersant Ukraina, October 24, 2011, accessed 
September 7, 2012, http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1801978.
13 Cf. Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU rules 
beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European 
politics,” Journal of European Public Policy 16 (2009): 791-812.
14 All relevant strategy documents are accessible on http://ec.europa.
eu/world/enp/documents_en.html.
of Ukraine, the EU’s commitment to norm transfer 
is more than just rhetoric and acts as constraint for 
security-related motives in turn. 
3.3 enhancing Security 
The EU pursues a comprehensive security agenda 
in relation to the neighbourhood. As the relevant 
strategy papers outline, the EU aims to stabilize 
and strengthen neighbouring countries through 
the ENP, thereby reducing security threats that 
emanate from instability, armed conflict and lack 
of state control over territory. Threats of this kind 
include terrorism, trans-border crime, disruptions 
in resource supplies and uncontrollable migration 
flows. These concerns also play an important 
role in the context of the Union’s relations with 
Ukraine: the long land border between Ukraine and 
the Schengen Area is a gateway for the smuggling 
of cigarettes, counterfeits and illegal drugs into the 
Union.15 Other border-related security issues are 
irregular migration and human trafficking.16 At the 
same time, Ukraine is an important transit corridor 
for natural resources. Indirectly, a significant share 
of the EU’s gas supplies depends on the country. 
Furthermore, Ukraine is an important partner for 
conflict regulation in the Moldovan separatist 
region of Transnistria.17 
Due to its comprehensiveness and legally 
binding character, the Association Agreement 
would provide the EU with an improved 
institutionalized basis for cooperation in fields 
important for EU security objectives. Negotiations 
on the Agreement have been finalized and Ukraine 
has clearly expressed its intention to let the 
Agreement enter into force at the earliest possible 
15 Europol, “OCTA 2011. EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment,” 
Europol (2011), accessed August 19, 2012, https://www.europol.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/octa2011.pdf.
16 IOM, “IOM Ukraine: Who We Are and What We Do,” 
International Organization for Migration (2011), accessed August 
19, 2012, http://iom.org.ua/en/pdf/WaWeDo_eng_b5_Upd.pdf.
17 Marco Siddi and Barbara Gaweda, “Bystander in its 
Neighbourhood? The European Union’s involvement in 
protracted conflicts in the post-Soviet space,” IEP Policy Papers 
on Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1 (2012), accessed January 
12, 2013, http://www.iep-berlin.de/943.html?&no_cache=1&tx_
ttnews[tt_news]=966.
IE
P 
Po
lic
y 
Pa
pe
rs
 o
n 
Ea
st
er
n 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 C
en
tr
al
 A
si
a
10
moment.18 The EU, however, refuses to proceed 
with signature and ratification of the agreement in 
the absence of visible improvements in the fields 
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.19 
By doing so, it ties the deepening of cooperation 
as a whole to compliance with norm transfer 
objectives. Thereby, the EU renders itself unable 
to make use of potential for deepened cooperation 
with Ukraine in security-related fields. Although 
Ukraine’s willingness to cooperate might be 
higher in those fields than in the normative 
sphere, the EU has set its priorities differently 
and is subordinating the security objective to its 
normative agenda. 
Considerations relating to the stability of 
Ukraine’s political system lead to the same 
conclusion: the monopolization of power by 
the political-oligarchic clan around president 
Yanukovych after the presidential elections in 
January 2010 have led to a higher degree of 
stability and consistency within the structures of 
the Ukrainian state. If normative concerns – such 
as an increase in corruption, a blurring of the 
separation of powers, the questionable democratic 
legitimacy of government formation, and the 
growing frequency of civil rights violations20 
– are taken aside, the situation represents an 
improvement in comparison to the constant power 
struggle between different state institutions that 
characterized Ukrainian politics in the years 
18 E.g. “Янукович не видит Европу без Украины; [Yanukovych 
does not see Europe without Ukraine],” Ukrainskaya Pravda, 
December 19, 2011, accessed September 7, 2012, http://www.
pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2011/12/19/6849757/;
 “Азаров: Техническое парафирование Соглашения о ЗСТ 
между Украиной и ЕС может состояться в ближайшие 
месяцы. [Azarov: Technical initialling of the Free Trade 
Agreement between Ukraine and the EU can take place over the 
next months],” Interfax Ukraina, February 10, 2012, accessed 
September 7, 2012, http://www.interfax.com.ua/rus/main/94223/.
19 E.g. Stefan Füle, “Speech on Ukraine in the Plenary Session of 
the European Parliament,” Speech/12/944 (2010), December 12, 
2012, accessed January 27, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-12-944_en.htm?locale=en.
20 Amnesty International, “Annual Report 2012 – Ukraine,” Amnesty 
International (2012),  accessed September 9, 2012, http://www.
amnesty.org/en/region/ukraine/report-2012; 
 David J. Kramer, Robert Nurick, Oleksandr Sushko, Viktoria 
Syumar, Damon Wilson and Matthew Schaaf, “Sounding the 
Alarm Round 2: Protecting Democracy in Ukraine. A Follow-
up Freedom House Report,” Freedom House (2012), accessed 
September 9, 2012, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-
reports/sounding-alarm-round-2-protecting-democracy-ukraine.
before. The EU’s refusal to deepen ties by signing 
and ratifying the Association Agreement at the 
present time is working against this stability. It 
denies the current administration the success of 
having led the country to a new stage of European 
integration and enables other political forces 
to present themselves as a truly pro-European 
alternative to a regime that has turned the EU 
against Ukraine and isolated the country. 
The EU seems firmly united in this approach. 
At the present time, no political force within 
the EU advocates to proceed with signature and 
ratification of the Association Agreement in spite 
of serious normative concerns solely for the sake 
of security cooperation or regime stability.21
 
3.4 Containing russia 
For obvious reasons, geopolitical objectives 
based on power and geostrategic influence are not 
explicitly spelt out in the official EU discourse 
on the purpose of the ENP. Nevertheless, 
numerous scholars argue that objectives of this 
kind are present in the EU’s external relations.22 
The question whether great power competition 
between the EU and Russia represents a decisive 
motive in design and implementation of the ENP 
remains controversial. However, it is clear that 
the EU would have to aim at securing Ukraine 
for its own sphere of geostrategic influence if 
it were aiming at containing Russia as a great 
power competitor in the eastern neighbourhood. 
Currently, Russia is more than just Ukraine’s most 
important trading partner. Due to the common 
Soviet legacy as well as cultural, political and 
language-related similarities, Russia has also 
remained a significant factor of influence in the 
21 Interviews with western diplomats in Kiev, May/June 2012.
22 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva, “Constraining external 
governance: interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to 
the EU’s rule transfer in Ukraine,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 16 (2009): 853-872; Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ 
power Europe: a realist critique,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 13 (2006): 217-234; Sten Rynning, “Realism and the 
Common Security and Defence Policy,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 49 (2011): 23-42; Andrew Wilson and Nicu 
Popescu, “Russian and European neighbourhood policies 
compared,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9 (2009): 
317-331.
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societal and political discourse on Ukrainian 
national identity and belonging.23 Furthermore, 
after the inauguration of Victor Yanukovych as 
president in early 2010, Ukrainian foreign policy 
has again taken a more Russia friendly turn by 
dropping NATO membership aspirations and 
extending the agreement on the Russian naval base 
in Sevastopol.
Ukraine’s current position can be seen as an 
important crossroads for the country. On the one 
hand, there is the European integration perspective 
which is currently deadlocked due to normative 
concerns on the side of the EU. On the other 
hand, Russia exerts pressure on Ukraine to join 
its customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan 
and to participate in Vladimir Putin’s proposal of 
a Eurasian Union. The two options are mutually 
exclusive. 
However, the EU does not seem to pay 
significant attention to this question. Advocates of 
a geostrategic approach who give a high priority to 
anchoring Ukraine in the EU’s sphere of influence 
just for the sake of keeping Russia at bay, 
constitute a minority among EU policy-makers 
and do not wield significant influence. According 
to the predominant approach, it is entirely up to 
Ukraine either to remain on the European path, or 
to follow the Belarusian example and isolate itself 
from Europe.24 Accordingly, the containment 
of Russian influence can be considered least 
important among the EU’s policy objectives in 
relation to the Association Agreement. 
Overall, this ranking of objectives indicates 
that the EU pursues a largely united strategy based 
on a consistent prioritization of policy objectives. 
The primary objective is risk aversion followed 
by norm transfer, security considerations and 
geostrategic containment. Consequently, the ENP 
in relation to Ukraine follows a clear purpose 
– namely the pursuit of these four objectives 
according to their prioritization – and fulfils 
the necessary precondition for effectiveness. 
However, the most important component of this 
23 Inna Melnykovska and Rainer Schweickert, “Balancing National 
Uncertainty and Foreign Orientation: Identity Building and the 
Role of Political Parties in Post-Orange Ukraine,” Europe-Asia 
Studies 63 (2008): 1055-1072.
24 Interviews with western diplomats in Kiev, May/June 2012.
purpose consists of an objective that is rarely 
acknowledged openly and explicitly by the EU, 
while the objectives which are most eagerly 
advertised are relegated to second and third place. 
4. reaching goals
4.1 Capabilities…
After the existence of a clear purpose underlying 
the ENP has been confirmed, the analysis can 
proceed to the second guiding question asking 
whether the EU lives up to its capabilities in the 
Ukrainian context.
As far as the most dominant policy objective 
is concerned, the capabilities of the EU are 
considerable. If the Union considers that the 
offer of a membership perspective to Ukraine 
or the offer of immediate unrestricted market 
access for agricultural products constitute risks 
that must not be taken under any circumstances, 
there is hardly anything Ukraine can do to extort 
such concessions. However, by making use 
of this freedom to rule something out, the EU 
simultaneously rules out incentives and arguments 
that would have a positive impact on the Union’s 
capabilities regarding the achievement of its 
other three policy objectives. In relation to these 
other objectives, incentives and arguments are 
important, since the EU cannot facilitate norm 
transfer, security cooperation and geostrategic 
containment on its own. It is not the EU but 
Ukraine that has to implement European norms, 
to agree to cooperate on security issues, and to 
choose the EU instead of Russia as a geostrategic 
reference point. All the EU can do is try to 
influence the behaviour of Ukraine in relation 
to these objectives. It can do so by using two 
instruments: First, the EU can apply conditionality 
by offering material incentives and rewards in 
exchange for behaviour that conforms to its 
objectives. Second, the EU can use socialization, 
which means engaging in dialogue and persuading 
relevant actors by argumentative means to adopt 
and pursue EU policy objectives. 
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4.1.1 Conditionality
As a consequence of its strongly risk-averse 
agenda, the EU can apply conditionality in the 
context of the Association Agreement negotiations 
only to a very limited extent. In the absence of a 
membership perspective and without the prospect 
of a significant increase in financial assistance, 
few material incentives remain on the table. 
Free trade is an incentive of considerable 
importance in this respect. On the long run, the 
Ukrainian economy could profit greatly from 
it. However, the effects of a free trade area are 
not entirely predictable and some branches of 
the Ukrainian economy might even suffer in the 
short-term. Moreover, trade liberalization in the 
shape of a mere abolition of quotas and tariffs 
would only have a moderate effect, since the 
remaining trade barriers of this kind do not carry 
great economic significance. In order to enjoy 
large-scale benefits, Ukraine has to facilitate 
free trade far beyond questions of quotas and 
tariffs. This includes the adoption of European 
product standards and sanitary norms as well as 
improvements in infrastructure, financial services 
and the investment climate.25 The adoption of 
standards, however, is an effort that Ukraine has 
to undertake, and not an incentive that the EU is 
able to offer.
Visa facilitation provides a less ambiguous 
incentive, since the need to obtain a visa for every 
visit to western Europe considerably complicates 
25 Volkhart Vincentz, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: An 
Economic Perspective,” in European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the New Neighbours, eds. 
Johannes Varwick and Kai Olaf Lang (Opladen and Farmington 
Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2007), 117-128; 
 Michael Emerson, T. Huw Edwards, Ildar Gazizullin, Matthias 
Lücke, Daniel Müller-Jentsch, Vira Nanivska, Valeriy Pyatnytskiy, 
Andreas Schneider, Rainer Schweickert, Olexandr Shevtsov, 
Olga Shumylo, “The Prospect of Deep Free Trade between the 
European Union and Ukraine,” Brussels, Kiel and Kyiv: Centre 
for European Policy Studies, Institut für Weltwirtschaft and 
International Centre for Policy Studies (2006), accessed May 
8, 2012, http://www.ceps.be/book/prospect-deep-free-trade-
between-european-union-and-ukraine; 
 Igor Burakovsky, Kateryna Kutsenko, Hanna Chukhai, Alla 
Kobylyanska, Veronika Movchan, Yevgen Razdorozhny and 
Natalia Sysenko, “Costs and Benefits of FTA between Ukraine 
and the European Union,” Kiev: Institute for Economic Research 
and Policy Consulting (2010), accessed September 6, 2012, 
http://www.ier.com.ua/en/publications/books/?pid=2633.
the life of many Ukrainians today. However, certain 
technical preconditions, such as the introduction 
of biometric passports, are crucial for the 
introduction of a visa free regime. Due to security 
concerns, the EU is not willing to compromise on 
these preconditions.26 However, progress towards 
them is, again, a matter of Ukrainian politics. 
Consequently, the EU is not able to use the actual 
introduction of visa free travel as an incentive that 
it can offer at any time and under any condition. 
All it can offer is the further pursuit of the visa 
facilitation roadmap,27 which currently can be 
suspended at any time since the document is not 
legally binding. Its status could be changed by the 
Association Agreement which contains a chapter 
on visa facilitation and provides a legally binding 
framework for the further implementation of the 
roadmap. At the same time, any further progress 
in the field of visa facilitation can be considered 
rather unlikely in the absence of the Agreement’s 
signature and ratification.28 Through the implicit 
threat of putting the whole process on hold, the 
EU turns any movement towards visa facilitation 
into an incentive and thus circumvents its inability 
to offer visa free travel straight away.
A last incentive that the EU has to offer in 
the present situation is the symbolic value of 
the Association Agreement. Name and scope 
of the Agreement, the drawn-out process of 
its negotiation, and the importance ascribed to 
it by Ukrainian politicians have endowed the 
Agreement with considerable political weight 
regardless of its actual content. Considering that 
the majority of Ukraine’s population is still in 
favour of European integration, but, at the same 
time, not very well informed about its actual 
consequences and mechanisms,29 the adoption of 
an Association Agreement with the EU as such 
has the potential to boost the political standing of 
26  Interviews with western diplomats in Kiev, May/June 2012.
27 Council of the European Union, “EU-Ukraine Visa Dialogue. 
Action Plan on Visa Liberalization”, Council of the European 
Union (2010), accessed May 10, 2012, http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st17/st17883.en10.pdf. 
28 Interviews with western diplomats and Ukrainian officials in 
Kiev, May/June 2012.
29 Interview with Mikhail Pashkov. Co-director, Foreign Relations 
and International Security Programmes. Razumkov Centre. Kiev, 
June 15, 2012, 10:00 am.
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the regime that facilitates it.
4.1.2 Socialization 
Ukraine provides rather favourable preconditions 
for socialization. Due to the negotiation of 
the Association Agreement, contacts between 
Ukrainian and EU officials have been frequent and 
intense on all political levels. Advocacy groups 
in favour of the adoption of European norms and 
standards have formed within certain parts of 
the state administration.30 Furthermore, the EU 
receives considerable attention in the Ukrainian 
media, while a number of think tanks and NGOs – 
both of Ukrainian and EU origin – are promoting 
European integration within the country. 
However, Ukraine’s Soviet legacy and the 
development of the country in the years after 
gaining independence have engrained certain 
societal and political features that counteract 
EU socialization efforts. Ukraine’s point of 
departure for Europeanization is a political system 
in which corruption is deeply rooted and that is 
dominated by oligarchic clan structures. These 
competing clan structures have virtually hijacked 
all institutional competences and democratic 
procedures in order to pursue their specific 
interests. In addition to this, the political system of 
Ukraine is suffering from mutual distrust between 
general society and political elites, systemic 
disrespect for the rule of law, the factual absence 
of ideology and political ideals, a dominance of 
short-term gains over sustainability, a strong 
position of the shadow economy, and a largely 
apathetic civil society. As far as these problems 
are concerned, the Orange Revolution did not 
represent the quantum leap of systemic transition 
as which it was perceived in the West. It rather 
represented a change of the ruling elite that led to 
a certain degree of superficial transformation but 
left the basic mechanisms of the system largely 
intact.31 
30 Kataryna Wolczuk, “Implementation without Coordination: The 
Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 61 (2009): 187-211.
31 Ivan Katchanovski, “The Orange Evolution? The ‘Orange 
Revolution’ and Political Changes in Ukraine,” Post-Soviet 
Affairs 24 (2008): 351-382; Paul Kubicek, “Problems of post-
Moreover, the limited transition brought 
about by the Orange Revolution was largely 
reversed in the aftermath of the 2010 presidential 
elections. The elected regime continues to pursue 
an approach to politics which is actually closer 
to the Russian authoritarian model than to EU 
standards. More than anything else, it is probably 
fear of international isolation or dependency on 
Russia that makes the current leadership pretend 
to adhere to the EU’s norms and values which it in 
fact neither shares nor completely understands.32 
These characteristics of Ukrainian politics 
and society represent systemic obstacles for EU 
socialization efforts. EU norms and standards 
are hardly in the interest of business networks 
based on short-term gains, nepotism and 
corruption. Assuming that at least some parts of 
these oligarchic networks are involved in illegal 
activities with trans-border character, EU security 
objectives might also have a number of influential 
opponents. In any case, norms and standards 
propagated by the EU have the potential to 
deprive Ukrainian political and economic elites of 
their means of existence. At the same time, a civil 
society afflicted by apathy and disillusionment 
paired with distrust towards politics in general 
also constitutes a rather difficult target for EU 
socialization efforts. 
To a certain extent, the above description 
oversimplifies the political situation in the country. 
Reform-averse patterns of the described kind 
cannot be considered absolutes. Nevertheless, the 
structural features outlined make a strong case for 
rather strong limitations to the EU’s socialization 
capabilities in relation to Ukraine.
Obviously, conditionality and socialization 
cannot be seen as strictly separated mechanisms, 
either. In the Ukrainian case, the limitations of 
both instruments reinforce each other. The modest 
post-communism: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution,” 
Democratization 16 (2009): 323-343; Taras Kuzio, “Political 
Culture and Democracy. Ukraine as an Immobile State,” 
East European Politics and Societies 25 (2011): 88-113; Inna 
Melnykovska, Rainer Schweickert and Tetiana Kostiuchenko, 
“Balancing National Uncertainty and Foreign Orientation: 
Identity Building and the Role of Political Parties in Post-Orange 
Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 63 (2011): 1055-1072.
32 Interview with Volodymyr Fesenko. Chairman of the Board. 
Centre for political studies “PENTA”. Kiev, June 8, 2012, 
11:00am.
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character of the incentives that the EU has to 
offer weakens argumentative persuasion efforts, 
while the structural factors which counteract 
socialization additionally reduce the impact of 
these incentives. In the face of two externalities 
– risk avoidance, which constitutes the Union’s 
dominating policy objective, and the nature of 
Ukrainian politics and society – the EU’s goal 
attainment capabilities in relation to its other 
policy objectives appear to be rather limited. 
4.2 … and actions 
As far as its predominant policy objective was 
concerned, the EU has not had any problems 
living up to its considerable capabilities. The EU 
was free not to take any risk it was not willing to 
take. By categorically refusing to offer Ukraine 
a membership perspective, by keeping financial 
assistance at a moderate level, and by bargaining 
hard on the technical details of the DCFTA, the EU 
acted according to this priority of risk avoidance. 
Considering the limitations which this risk-
averse behaviour imposed on the EU’s capabilities 
regarding the three remaining policy objectives, 
the finalization of the Association Agreement 
in its given form can already be considered a 
significant success. During the course of the 
negotiation process, the EU has made good use of 
its socialization capabilities in order to persuade 
the Ukrainian side to legally commit itself to 
the adoption of a significant share of the Acquis 
Communitaire. The Association Agreement 
envisages a degree of regulatory harmonization 
that goes beyond what was agreed in the so-
called Europe Agreements concluded with the 
Central and Eastern European Countries in the 
1990s.33 Furthermore, the establishment of a 
DCFTA with the EU would prevent Ukraine from 
undertaking further steps of economic integration 
towards Russia. Despite the considerable scale 
of these commitments, immediate rewards were 
not offered in exchange for them – apart from 
the highly uncertain short-term impact of the 
envisaged DCFTA. In fact, all that Ukraine 
received in return for its commitments was the 
33  Interviews with western diplomats in Kiev, May/June 2012.
argument that these commitments will yield 
considerable benefits on the long run if they are 
accompanied by continued reform efforts. 
Moreover, after the negotiations on the 
Agreement’s content were finalized, the EU began 
to use it as an incentive in terms of conditionality. 
The Agreement’s content is clear and agreed upon. 
What is left is a dichotomous decision – either to 
let the Agreement enter into force or to leave it. 
Although the short-term impact of the Agreement 
appears uncertain, EU socialization efforts have 
drawn attention to the possible long-term benefits. 
Moreover, the Agreement has accumulated 
considerable symbolic significance over the years 
of its negotiation. Consequently, its entering into 
force appears at present as a crucial threshold for 
EU-Ukraine relations, which has to be passed in 
order for Ukraine to make any further progress 
towards European integration. In this situation, 
the EU has put signature and ratification of the 
Agreement on hold and is linking further progress 
to conditions. By using this threshold effect34, the 
EU makes maximum use of the limited incentives 
it has at its disposal to facilitate its policy goals by 
means of conditionality. 
However, the application of threshold 
conditionality in relation to the Agreement could 
have been prepared by the EU in a more far-
sighted way. First signs of a negative trend in 
regard to democratic standards, human rights 
and the rule of law in Ukraine could be observed 
already during the first months after president 
Yanukovych’s inauguration in February 2010.35 
The EU largely ignored these developments. 
34 The concept of a threshold effect is based on Time Haughton, 
“When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the 
Accession Process in Central and Eastern Europe,” Political 
Studies Review 5 (2007): 233-246 and Iryna Solonenko, 
“European Neighborhood Policy after Four Years: Has it Had any 
Impact on the Reform Process in Ukraine?” International Issues 
& Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs 17 (2008): 20-40. 
35 Kyryl Savin and Andreas Stein, “Einhundert Tage Präsidentschaft 
von Wiktor Janukowytsch,” Kiev: Heinrich Boell Foundation 
(2010), accessed September 10, 2011, http://www.boell.
de/weltweit /europanordamerika/europa-nordamerika-
regierungszeit-wiktor-janukowytsch-9404.html;
 Gerhard Simon, “Demokratie und Nation: Bleibt die Ukraine 
auf dem europäischen Weg?” in Nationale Demokratie in der 
Ukraine, ed. Jerzy Mackóv (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, 
2011), 43-51, accessed November 4, 2011, http://www.hss.de/
uploads/tx_ddceventsbrowser/AMZ-75_Ukraine.pdf.
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Concern may have been voiced through 
diplomatic channels, but the EU failed to use the 
supportive power of public and media attention 
in order to issue an unambiguous early warning 
stating that the Association Agreement’s fate was 
inseparably linked to Ukrainian adherence to 
the EU’s core values. On the contrary, in March 
2010, EU officials even gave advance approval 
to president Yanukovych’s plan to install a new 
government by means of a procedure that was 
highly questionable in terms of democratic 
legitimacy.36 Only towards the end of the year 
the EU intensified its socialization efforts with 
the aim of contravening the decline of its core 
values in Ukraine. This inconsistent behaviour 
was creating the impression on the Ukrainian 
side that the EU would conclude the Association 
Agreement regardless of normative concerns. 
More outspoken reactions on the side of the EU at 
an earlier point in time could have prevented this 
misconception. 
Furthermore, from the very beginning of the 
negotiation process, the EU could have extended 
socialization efforts more actively beyond the 
closed doors of the negotiation venues. A more 
comprehensive effort could have been made by 
the EU to explain the nature and content of the 
proposed agreement in greater detail to the general 
public. The EU could have emphasized more 
strongly that the Agreement does not represent 
a European gift but a toolkit for change through 
domestic reform which bears considerable 
potential but requires continued political attention. 
A broadened socialization effort of this kind could 
have shifted expectations from the EU to the 
Ukrainian leadership and could have improved the 
general understanding of the ENP and its motives 
by the Ukrainian public. The latter is crucial for 
an agreement and a policy which largely rely on 
domestic political reform in Ukraine. Especially in 
the current situation it is extremely important that 
not only the Ukrainian political elite but also the 
public understands the reasons for which the EU 
refuses to proceed with signature and ratification 
36 Andreas Umland, “Is Europe Losing Ukraine?” Foreign Policy 
Journal (2010), accessed May 8, 2012, Available from: http://
www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/04/12/is-europe-losing-
ukraine/0/.
of the Agreement.
Beyond the sphere of purely rhetorical and 
explanatory means, the EU could have broadened 
its socialization agenda through more active 
cooperation with civil society organizations. 
Room for improvement in this area still exists. 
The EU still fails to use the full potential of 
Ukrainian civil society and focuses its cooperation 
efforts largely on government structures. Stronger 
ideational support of civil society organizations 
– for example through information exchange and 
cooperation in the evaluation of reform progress – 
as well as a rechanneling of financial flows away 
from budget support for government structures 
towards civil society organizations could increase 
the transformative leverage of the EU in Ukraine.37 
5. the eNP in ukraine – Cons-
trained but effective
According to the analytical framework applied, 
the effectiveness of the ENP depends on 
• The existence of a consistent purpose 
underlying the policy
• The size of the gap between the EU’s 
capabilities to facilitate the achievement of its 
policy objectives and the actions taken by the 
Union. 
A clear purpose in the form of a consistent set of 
prioritized policy objectives has been identified in 
the case of Ukraine. The subsequent analysis of 
the capability-facilitation gap has revealed some 
shortcomings regarding the EU’s communication 
strategy and the inclusion of Ukrainian civil 
society actors. However, these deficiencies are far 
from outweighing the successful finalization of 
the Agreement and its application as an instrument 
of threshold conditionality. Accordingly, the size 
of the gap has to be considered moderate, and the 
ENP in relation to the EU-Ukraine Association 
agreement is largely effective.
Naturally, this assessment is subject to change 
37 Mariella Falkenhain and Iryna Solonenko, “The EU and 
Civil Society in Eastern Europe: Partners in the Pursuit of 
Policy Change?” in Policy Change in the EU’s Immediate 
Neighbourhood: Sectoral Approaches, eds. Tanja A. Börzel and 
Katrin Böttger (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), 56-76.
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over time. If EU conditionality and socialization 
contribute to significant changes in Ukrainian 
politics, the Agreement will be able to enter 
into force in the near future. In this case, further 
socialization efforts will be required to facilitate 
the actual implementation of the Agreement’s 
provisions. At the same time, visa facilitation will 
be left as the only remaining significant incentive 
that the EU has to offer, and calls for a membership 
perspective are likely to intensify with increasing 
reform progress in Ukraine. Different challenges 
will arise in case there is no decisive change: the 
EU will have to decide whether or not to withhold 
funding or put sanctions in place; it will have to 
decide whether or not to put a complete hold on the 
visa facilitation process; and it will have to decide 
whether or not to continue the dialogue with 
Ukraine’s political leadership. In both cases, the 
EU will face the challenge of deciding what degree 
of political changes will be sufficient to allow for 
signature and ratification of the agreement. At 
this point in time, great emphasis is placed on 
democratic standards and on the selective criminal 
prosecution of opposition members. However, the 
exact criteria for democratic performance, and the 
exact actions required of the Ukrainian leadership 
to prove that it has put an end to selective justice 
are subject to debate.
These different challenges have the potential 
to redefine the policy objectives, the capabilities 
and the actions of the EU and its Member States. 
Therefore, the way in which the EU responds to 
them will have a decisive impact on the future 
assessment of the ENP’s effectiveness.
6. the eNP as a Whole – the 
Wider Context
The finding that the ENP is largely effective in the 
case of Ukraine means that an important benchmark 
for the policy’s overall effectiveness has been met. 
It proves that the EU is able to define a consistent 
set of prioritized policy objectives and to pursue 
these objectives according to its capabilities in the 
Ukrainian context. This has been the case in spite 
of the fact that considerable potential for tensions 
between different policy objectives exists within 
the EU. Hence the Union has proven to be able to 
overcome significant challenges in order to apply 
the ENP successfully to a neighbouring country of 
supreme importance. 
In other countries, the effectiveness of the ENP 
probably depends on a set of policy objectives 
that is similar to the one present in the Ukrainian 
context. Being the EU’s top-priority in the 
country that has advanced furthest within the ENP 
framework, risk avoidance is unlikely to have a 
less important status as a policy objective in other 
cases. The same assumption can be made regarding 
geostrategic containment as the objective with the 
lowest priority: Ukraine is the prime example of a 
country torn between two spheres of geostrategic 
influence and its integration represents a unique 
opportunity for the EU to contain Russian power. 
Nevertheless, the EU has turned down Ukraine’s 
clear membership ambitions in favour of its other 
policy objectives. In the light of this observation, 
the realist objective of containing geostrategic 
competitors can be safely regarded as a policy 
goal that has been sidelined within the ENP 
framework as a whole. 
Concerning the middleground of ENP 
objectives – norm transfer and security 
cooperation – the outcomes of comparative 
prioritization probably show a greater variety 
across different countries. Normative objectives 
enjoy a particularly high priority in the Ukrainian 
context for three reasons. First, the Orange 
Revolution and the strong European aspirations 
expressed by the Ukrainian leadership ever since 
have given the normative dimension a particular 
symbolic importance. Second, unlike the other 
countries in the ENP’s eastern dimension, Ukraine 
is not directly involved in any separatist conflict. 
Third, in spite of Ukraine’s general significance 
for EU security objectives, the country has not 
been at the centre of related concerns in recent 
years: energy supplies have been stable since the 
gas crisis in January 2009, Ukraine joined the 
European energy community in 2010, and new 
pipelines circumventing the country are either 
being planned or already in place. At present, 
Europol locates most of the EU’s “crime hubs” 
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in regions not bordering Ukraine.38 Migration 
pressure is far stronger at the EU’s southern 
borders and Ukraine already ratified a readmission 
agreement with the EU in 2008. 
In numerous other ENP countries, 
democratization hopes have not been raised as 
high as those pertaining to Ukraine. At the same 
time, the possibility of armed conflict exists in 
many of these countries, or other EU security 
concerns are more imminent than in Ukraine. 
In those countries, EU security objectives are 
likely to enjoy a higher priority which possibly 
outpaces norm transfer. The Union’s approach to 
the ENP in the Middle East represents a situation 
of this kind, in which security and stability 
concerns are more important for the Union than 
normative considerations.39 Similar circumstances 
characterize the ENP towards Azerbaijan where 
the country’s importance as a source of natural 
resources limits the Union’s leverage regarding 
norm transfer.40 Another example is the history 
of EU-Libya cooperation on migration issues. 
The containment of refugee flows held a priority 
on the EU’s agenda that was sufficiently high 
to force the Union into cooperation with Libya 
before the country had even accepted the ENP as 
a policy framework, not to speak of any adoption 
of EU norms.41 Such swaps in priority between 
normative and security-related objectives do 
not necessarily lead to an ineffectiveness of the 
ENP in the respective case. However, the strong 
emphasis that the EU places on norms and values 
in almost all statements and documents released 
on the ENP has the potential to cause confusion 
and hamper the effectiveness of the policy if 
normative objectives are not only second but third 
in line, after both risk avoidance and security 
concerns. At the same time, any failure to live 
up to its normative rhetoric hampers the political 
38 Europol, “OCTA 2011”, 50.
39 Peter Seeberg, “European Neighbourhood Policy, Post-
normativity, and Pragmatism,” European Foreign Affairs Review 
15 (2010): 663-679.
40 Anja Franke, Andrea Gawrich, Inna Melnykovska and Rainer 
Schweickert, “The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and 
Azerbaijan,” Post Soviet Affairs 26 (2010): 149-283. 
41 Sara Hamood, “EU-Libya Cooperation on Migration: A Raw 
Deal for Refugees and Migrants?” Journal of Refugee Studies 21 
(2008): 19-42. 
credibility of the Union both internally and 
worldwide.
Moreover, Ukraine’s position as the ENP 
frontrunner draws attention to the general 
limitations of the policy’s capabilities to influence 
developments in the partner countries. It has 
been outlined that these capabilities are severely 
limited by both the priority that the EU gives 
to risk avoidance and by systemic obstacles 
within Ukrainian politics and society. While risk 
avoidance probably constitutes the dominating 
policy objective for the ENP as a whole, systemic 
obstacles are far higher in countries which 
are geographically, culturally and historically 
further detached from Europe and have never 
shown accession aspirations. Consequently, EU 
capabilities will be even smaller in most other 
ENP countries. This does not necessarily render 
the ENP less effective, but reduces its factual 
impact in the partner countries. Georgia and 
Moldova represent exceptions in this respect. 
Both countries seem to have surpassed Ukraine in 
terms of reform ambitions and are trying hard to 
catch up with the actual association process.42 
Finally, the case of Ukraine illustrates that the 
ENP is a fluid process. Its effectiveness is subject 
to external factors which change over time and 
which the EU cannot influence significantly. The 
policy’s effectiveness in the Ukrainian context 
depended on two coinciding political processes – 
the negotiation of the Association Agreement, and 
a regime change in the country. A counterfactual 
sequence of events – for example signature and 
ratification of the Association Agreement before 
Viktor Yanukovych’s victory in the presidential 
elections of 2010 – would have led to an entirely 
different situation. 
Regardless of this coincidence, the new 
regime decided to change the course of the ENP’s 
“flagship”43 although the country’s relations with 
the EU were approaching the threshold to a new 
stage. Up to today, even the EU’s attempt to use 
the full weight of the Association Agreement, 
as the supposedly most far-reaching instrument 
42  Interviews with western diplomats in Kiev, May/June 2012.
43  Iryna Solonenko, “European Neighborhood Policy after Four 
Years”, 23.
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available to the ENP, has not succeeded in 
bringing the flagship back on track, and it is 
highly uncertain whether the situation will change 
in the near future. 
There is the clear possibility that Moldova 
and Georgia will overtake Ukraine on the track 
to both domestic reform and association with the 
EU. However, the Ukrainian example implies 
that a turnaround cannot be excluded in those 
cases, either. This leads to the conclusion that the 
changes which the ENP induces in neighbouring 
countries are fragile and easily revisable. They 
appear to lack ‘stickiness’– while the only thing 
that seems to be extremely sticky in the context 
of the ENP is the EU’s reluctance to make 
commitments it considers risky.  
7. Conclusion and Policy re-
commendations
This policy paper has examined the effectiveness 
of the ENP in relation to Ukraine on the basis 
of a two-step approach. First, the existence of 
a consistent purpose underlying a policy has 
been defined as a precondition for effectiveness. 
This precondition is considered to be fulfilled if 
the EU manages to agree on a set of prioritized 
policy objectives which form the basis of a policy 
without undermining its purpose by exhibiting 
diametrically contradictory functions. Second, the 
actual degree of effectiveness is measured by the 
relation between the EU’s capabilities to achieve 
its policy objectives in a given context and the 
actions taken by the Union in order to facilitate 
this achievement. The smaller the size of this 
capability-facilitation gap, the more effective the 
policy. 
The analysis was structured according to four 
guiding questions:
• Is the EU’s strategy based on a consistent set 
of prioritized policy objectives?
• To what extent does the implementation of this 
strategy match the EU’s capabilities to achieve 
these policy objectives? 
• What are the implications of the findings from 
the Ukrainian context for the ENP as a whole? 
• Which measures can the EU undertake in order 
to enhance the effectiveness of the ENP in 
Ukraine and elsewhere?
Regarding the first question, it has been found that 
a consistent set of prioritized policy objectives 
exists in the Ukrainian context. Risk avoidance 
constitutes the EU’s dominant policy objective, 
followed by norm transfer, security interests and 
the containment of Russian influence. In practice, 
this means that the EU’s dominant concern is the 
avoidance of perceived political and economic risks 
– namely the proposal of a membership perspective 
to Ukraine, the investment of significant financial 
resources, and the concession of significant one-
sided advantages in bilateral trade relations. The 
avoidance of those risks is given priority over 
the objective to transfer EU norms to Ukraine. In 
turn, norm transfer holds a dominant position in 
relation to the security dimension as far as both 
objectives do not reinforce each other. Lastly, the 
objective to contain Russia and secure Ukraine for 
the EU’s sphere of geostrategic influence clearly 
plays a subordinated role and can be considered a 
side effect. 
Due to the existence of this prioritized agenda 
and the absence of significant dissent within the 
EU, the ENP in relation to Ukraine fulfils the 
precondition for effectiveness.
Regarding the second question, the findings are 
twofold. On the one hand, the capabilities of the 
EU are limited in relation to the facilitation of all 
policy objectives other than risk avoidance. There 
are again two reasons for this. First, the dominance 
of risk aversion leaves EU conditionality with 
only two incentives of moderate attractiveness to 
facilitate the achievement of its other goals: a visa 
free regime, which, for technical reasons, Ukraine 
is not yet ready to introduce, and a DCFTA that 
has an uncertain short-term effect while its long-
term benefits largely depend on domestic reform 
efforts. Second, systemic features of Ukrainian 
politics and society contravene EU socialization 
efforts. The prevalence of corruption and the 
domination of the political elite by oligarchic clan 
structures create interests within the Ukrainian 
leadership, which would be threatened by 
comprehensive Europeanization. 
In sum, the EU has managed to mainly live up 
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to its limited capabilities. Without compromising 
on the dominance of risk aversion, the EU has 
succeeded in convincing the Ukrainian leadership 
to accept an Association Agreement that obliges 
the country to move towards the Union’s policy 
objectives. Although the immediate returns 
of the Agreement are uncertain, it has gained 
considerable symbolic significance over the years, 
which helps the EU to turn its finalized version 
into a general threshold for further integration. 
Signature and ratification of this threshold are 
made subject to progress in relation to the EU’s 
normative objectives. By this means, the EU 
strengthens the limited incentives at its disposal. 
Through a combination of threshold conditionality 
with continued socialization, the EU uses its 
capabilities in an optimal way. 
However, some deficits were observed in 
relation to the communicational preparation 
of this approach. The EU could have practiced 
socialization more broadly and vigorously in 
previous years, and it still has not fully met its 
potential in terms of supporting civil society 
movements. Nevertheless, these deficits do not 
outweigh the EU’s achievements. On the whole, 
the gap between the Union’s capabilities and its 
actions is not overly large and, accordingly, the 
ENP in relation to Ukraine can be considered 
largely effective. 
Regarding the third question, the case of 
Ukraine shows that even a largely effective ENP 
is not very powerful in terms of actual impact 
on developments in the partner country. While 
it cannot be said that the EU does not make any 
difference, it is far from certain that the EU’s 
current approach will lead to a decisive change 
in Ukrainian politics – in spite of the fact that the 
EU is using virtually its full potential for influence 
in the current situation. At the same time, the 
observed effectiveness appears vulnerable in 
the face of new challenges which automatically 
will arise as circumstances evolve in one way or 
the other. Due to the ENP’s limited impact, this 
evolvement can take various unexpected turns. 
Consequently, it will not be easy for the EU to 
continue the pursuit of a united, consistent strategy 
that makes optimal use of the Union’s capabilities 
in the face of unpredictable developments.
Although the ENP has the potential for a 
degree of effectiveness similar to the Ukrainian 
case in relation to other countries, the limitations 
identified by the case study are also likely to affect 
the policy as a whole. The dominance of risk 
aversion as a policy objective probably applies to 
the ENP in general. What is more, limited impact, 
limited stickiness and fragility over time are 
likely to be even stronger in other cases, taking 
into account that Ukraine was considered an ENP 
front-runner with clear European aspirations. 
In the light of these findings, the policy 
recommendations which answer the last guiding 
question depend on the future priorities of the 
EU. On the basis of risk aversion, effectiveness is 
comparatively easily achieved, since an objective 
which does not require the ENP to have an actual 
impact on the neighbourhood becomes its most 
important determinant. On the contrary, the 
objective of risk avoidance requires the EU to 
restrain its engagement, which is not hard to do, 
but which, in turn, constrains the Union’s impact 
potential. If a degree of effectiveness similar to the 
current state of the Ukrainian case can be ascribed 
to the ENP as a whole, this effectiveness will be 
based on a rather restrictive self-understanding 
of the EU as a foreign policy actor. It will be 
based on a kind of actorness, which, for the sake 
of caution, deliberately limits its own impact and 
prefers passivity. Obviously, it is the EU’s choice 
to set its priorities this way. However, in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of this approach in the 
Ukrainian context, the following additional steps 
would be advisable: 
• The EU should openly acknowledge the 
primacy of risk avoidance over normative 
objectives in its political agenda and explicitly 
scale down its normative ambitions. It should 
be made clear both to the governments of 
neighbouring countries and to the general 
public that the Union welcomes the adoption 
of its norms and values by Ukraine but that the 
incentives it has to offer in return are highly 
limited. 
• The EU should avoid the impression to make 
demands without offering anything in return 
by clearly presenting European integration 
according to the framework provided by the 
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Association Agreement as Ukraine’s free 
choice and not as a political imperative for 
Ukraine or the EU.
• The EU should step up its financial and 
ideational support of Ukrainian civil society. 
At the same time, support for the public 
administration should be reduced to institutions 
and projects which have proven to be willing 
and able to advocate the EU’s objectives. 
• The EU should treat its few remaining 
incentives carefully. It should firmly link the 
ratification of the Association Agreement and 
further progress along the visa facilitation 
roadmap to fundamental changes in the 
Ukrainian political environment. Reforms 
have to be systemic, credible and difficult to 
reverse. By all means, the EU should avoid 
giving away its last incentives in exchange for 
lip service or symbolic concessions. 
If the EU wants to play a more proactive role in 
the neighbourhood and increase the actual impact 
potential of the ENP, a shift of priorities away 
from risk avoidance will be inevitable. In this case, 
the following actions would be advisable in the 
Ukrainian context:
• The EU should offer Ukraine a membership 
perspective. This perspective should be made 
subject to rigorous conditions, part of which 
have to be the Copenhagen Criteria and the full 
implementation of the Association Agreement. 
While it has to be made clear that the accession 
process is open-ended and likely to be long 
and difficult, the EU should leave no doubts 
concerning its commitment to Ukrainian 
membership as the ultimate goal of its policy 
towards the country.
• The EU should proceed with signature and 
ratification of the Association Agreement 
as soon as first signs of an improvement 
regarding the situation of democracy, the rule 
of law and human rights in Ukraine become 
apparent. Visa facilitation should be pursued 
according to the roadmap regardless of the 
political situation in order to enable additional 
socialization measures through visa-free travel.
• The EU should significantly increase the 
funding for the ENP in relation to Ukraine 
as soon as the Association Agreement enters 
into force. In order to make such additional 
financial resources available, the EU would 
need to consider a small reduction of EU 
expenditure in larger headings of the EU 
budget, for example the agricultural subsidies. 
A considerable part of these resources should 
be used to support the implementation of the 
Association Agreement with Ukraine and 
to provide additional financial support for 
Ukrainian civil society. 
Considering the dominant political discourse 
within the EU, the challenges brought about by 
the public debt crisis, and the financial framework 
that the European Council has proposed for 
2014-2020, it appears unlikely that the Union 
will be willing to change its overall approach 
to the ENP. In all probability, the EU will stick 
to its current prioritization of objectives for the 
foreseeable future, which means that the first set 
of recommendations applies. Nevertheless, the 
question remains whether a restrained foreign 
policy approach of this kind is appropriate for an 
EU that is facing the reality of a globalizing world. 
Not only does the international community expect 
the Union to play a leading role in global affairs, 
aspirations to be a strong foreign policy actor are 
also very present in the EU’s own rhetoric. That the 
EU will be able to live up to these expectations and 
aspirations without shifting its priorities is highly 
doubtful. It rather seems that the Union prefers 
resignation and the acceptance of powerlessness 
in foreign affairs to a new challenge and to the 
acceptance of additional risks in already difficult 
times. Time will tell whether this is a wise decision. 
